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Abstract
In order to handle undesirable failures of a multicopter which occur in either the pre-flight
process or the in-flight process, a failsafe mechanism design method based on supervisory control
theory is proposed for the semi-autonomous control mode 1. Failsafe mechanism is a control logic
that guides what subsequent actions the multicopter should take, by taking account of real-time
information from guidance, attitude control, diagnosis, and other low-level subsystems. In order
to design a failsafe mechanism for multicopters, safety issues of multicopters are introduced.
Then, user requirements including functional requirements and safety requirements are textually
described, where function requirements determine a general multicopter plant, and safety require-
ments cover the failsafe measures dealing with the presented safety issues. In order to model the
user requirements by discrete-event systems, several multicopter modes and events are defined.
On this basis, the multicopter plant and control specifications are modeled by automata. Then, a
supervisor is synthesized by monolithic supervisory control theory. In addition, we present three
examples to demonstrate the potential blocking phenomenon due to inappropriate design of control
specifications. Also, we discuss the meaning of correctness and the properties of the obtained
supervisor. This makes the failsafe mechanism convincingly correct and effective. Finally, based on
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1Most multicopters have two high-level control modes: semi-autonomous control and full-autonomous control. Many open
source autopilots support both modes. The semi-autonomous control mode implies that autopilots can be used to stabilize
the attitude of multicopters, and also they can help multicopters to hold the altitude and position. Under such a mode, a
multicopter will be still under the control of remote pilots. On the other hand, the full-autonomous control mode implies
that the multicopter can follow a pre-programmed mission script stored in the autopilot which is made up of navigation
commands, and also can take off and land automatically. Under such a mode, remote pilots on the ground only need to
schedule the tasks [1].
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2the obtained supervisory controller generated by TCT software, an implementation method suitable
for multicopters is presented, in which the supervisory controller is transformed into decision-making
codes.
Keywords: Multicopter, failsafe mechanism, supervisory control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multicopters are well-suited to a wide range of mission scenarios, such as search and rescue
[2], [3], package delivery [4], border patrol [5], military surveillance [6] and agricultural
production [7]. In either pre-flight process or in-flight process, multicopter failures cannot
be absolutely avoided. These failures may abort missions, crash multicopters, and moreover,
injure or even kill people. In order to handle undesirable failures in industrial systems, a
technique named Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is presented [8]. As shown in
Figure 1, an integrated PHM system generally contains three levels: monitoring, prediction
and management [9]. On the one hand, the monitoring and prediction levels assess the
quantitative health of the studied system, where some quantitative indices are introduced
to measure system health, such as residuals [10]-[12], data features [13], [14] and reliability-
based indices [15]-[18]. On the other hand, the management level imports the quantitative
health results from the monitoring and prediction levels, and then responds to meet qualitative
safety or health requirements. In our previous paper [19], multicopter health is quantitatively
evaluated in the face of actuator failures. This paper studies a safety decision-making logic by
Supervisory Control Theory (SCT) to guarantee flight safety from a qualitative perspective.
Plant
Sensing apparatus
Observed behavior
Management
Prediction
Monitoring
PHM
system
Fig. 1. PHM framework
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3In the framework of multicopters, guidance, attitude control, PHM, and other low-level
subsystems work together under the coordination of a high-level decision-making module
[20]. In this module, a failsafe mechanism is an important part. It is a control logic that
receives information from all subsystems to decide the best flight maneuver from a global
perspective, and send flight instructions to low-level subsystems [21]. However, current
academic literature covering failure-related topics of multicopters mainly focuses on fault
detection techniques [22]-[26] and fault-tolerant control algorithms [27]-[32], which belong to
a study of low-level subsystems. For the study of the high-level decision-making module, most
research focuses on path planning [33]-[35] and obstacle avoidance [36], [37] of an individual
multicopter, or PHM-based mission allocation of a multicopter team [6], [38], [39]. However,
few studies have focused on the failsafe mechanism design of an individual multicopter
subject to multiple potential failures. References [40], [41] proposed an emergency flight
planning for an energy-constrained situation. Reference [42] proposed a failsafe design for
an uncontrollable situation. Reference [43] designed multiple failsafe measures dealing with
different anomalies of unmanned aerial vehicles. Nevertheless, that research only considers
certain ad-hoc failsafe mechanisms for certain faults or anomalies, and so far does not
present a comprehensive failsafe mechanism for a multicopter. In current autopilot products
(for example, DJI autopilot [44] and ArduPilot [45]), there exist comprehensive failsafe
mechanisms to cope with communication, sensor and battery failures, but such mechanisms
are either proprietary, or can be accessed only in part. Moreover, as far as the authors know,
these failsafe mechanisms are mainly developed and synthesized according to engineering
experience. As a result, such a development process lacks a theoretical foundation; this will
inevitably lead to man-made mistakes, logical bugs and an incomplete treatment. Motivated
by these, this paper first summarizes safety issues and user requirements for multicopters
in the semi-autonomous control manner as comprehensively and systematically as possible,
and then uses SCT of Discrete-Event Systems (DES) to design a failsafe mechanism of
multicopters.
SCT [46], [47], also known as Ramadge-Wonham (RW) theory, is a method for synthesizing
supervisors that restrict the behavior of a plant such that as much as possible of the given
control specifications are fulfilled and never violated. Currently, SCT has been developed
with a solid theoretical foundation [48]-[50], and it has been successfully applied to practical
systems such as flexible manufacturing systems [51]-[53]. Thus, this paper formalizes the
problem of failsafe mechanism design as a DES control problem. The solution procedure
is shown in Figure 2. In order to obtain the expected failsafe mechanism, the following
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4steps are performed: 1) define related modes and events by studying the user requirements
(including functional and safety requirements); 2) model the multicopter plant by transforming
the functional requirements to an automaton with defined modes and events; 3) analyze the
safety requirements by taking the defined modes and events into account, and transform the
safety requirements to automata as control specifications; 4) synthesize the supervisor by
TCT software; 5) implementation the failsafe mechanism based on the obtained supervisor.
Multicopter
Safety
requirements
Functional
requirements
Mode and event
definition
Plant design
Control
specification
design
Supervisor
synthesis
Implementation
Fig. 2. Solution procedure to design failsafe mechanism of multicopters
The contributions of the paper mainly lie in two aspects.
• First, this paper introduces SCT into a new application area. The proposed SCT based
method in this paper is a scientific method with solid theoretical foundation to design
the failsafe mechanism of multicopters. In the field of aircraft engineering, especially of
multicopters and drones, traditional design methods are based on engineering experience.
The failsafe mechanism obtained by these methods may be problematic (for example,
the failsafe mechanism may contain unintended deadlocks), especially when multiple
safety issues are taken into account. Compared to existing empirical design methods,
the proposed method can guarantee the correctness and effectiveness of the obtained
failsafe mechanism owing to the properties of supervisors. This is an urgent need for
multicopter designers and manufacturers.
• Second, for the application of SCT, this paper emphasizes the modeling process of the
plant and control specifications with a practical application, rather than developing a
new theory of SCT. We believe this work is important to both the development of SCT
research and practical engineering, because SCT is presented with complex mathemat-
ical terminology and theory which many engineers may not understand. Motivated by
this, this paper presents the procedure of applying SCT to an engineering problem,
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5from requirements described textually, to specificarions in form of automata, then to
a synthesized supervisor and finally to implementation on a real-time flight simulation
platform of quadcopters developed by MATLAB. In addition, we present three examples
to demonstrate the potential blocking phenomenon due to inappropriate design of control
specifications. From the perspective of practitioners, this paper can be a guide for
engineers, who are not familiar with SCT, to solve their own problems in their own
projects by SCT and related software.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents preliminaries of
SCT for the convenience of presenting the subsequent sections. Section III lists some relevant
safety issues of multicopters. Also, user requirements including functional requirements and
safety requirements are textually described. In order to transform the user requirements to
automata, several multicopter modes and events are defined in Section IV. On this basis, a
detailed modeling process of the multicopter plant and control specifications is presented in
Section V, where functional requirements determine a general multicopter plant, and safety
requirements are modeled as control specifications. Then, TCT software is used to perform
the process of supervisor synthesis. Section VI illustrates three examples to demonstrate some
possible reasons leading to a problematic supervisor, and gives a brief discussion about the
scope of applications and properties of the used method. Section VII shows an implementation
process of the proposed failsafe mechanism on the platform of MATLAB and FlightGear.
Section VIII presents our conclusion and suggests future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL THEORY
As SCT is well established, readers can refer to textbooks [46], [55], [56] for detailed
background and knowledge. This section only reviews some basic concepts and notation.
In RW theory [46], [47], the formal structure of DES is modeled by an automaton (gen-
erator)
G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Qm) (1)
where Q is the finite state set; Σ is the finite event set (also called an alphabet); δ : Q×Σ → Q
is the (partial) transition function; q0 ∈ Q is the initial state; Qm ⊆ Q is the subset of marker
states. Let Σ∗ denote the set of all finite strings, including the empty string ǫ. In general, δ
is extended to δ : Q × Σ∗ → Q, and we write δ (q, s)! to mean that δ (q, s) is defined. The
closed behavior of G is the language
L (G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|δ (q, s)!}
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6and the marked behavior is
Lm (G) = {s ∈ L (G) |δ (q0, s) ∈ Qm} ⊆ L (G) .
A string s1 is a prefix of a string s, written s1 6 s, if there exists s2 such that s1s2 = s.
The prefix closure of Lm (G) is Lm (G) := {s1 ∈ Σ
∗| (∃s ∈ Lm (G)) s1 6 s}. We say that
G is nonblocking if Lm (G) = L (G). The three equivalent meanings of “nonblocking” are
1) the system can always reach a marker state from every reachable state; 2) every string in
the closed behavior can be extended to a string in the marked behavior; 3) every physically
possible execution can be extended to completing distinguished tasks.
The usual way to combine several automata into a single, more complex automaton
is called synchronous product. For two automata Gi = (Qi,Σi, δi, q0,i, Qm,i) , i = 1, 2,
the synchronous product G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Qm) of G1 and G2, denoted by G1‖G2, is
constructed to have marked behavior Lm (G) = Lm (G1) ‖Lm (G2) and closed behavior
L (G) = L (G1) ‖L (G2) [46, Chapter 3.3]. The synchronous product of more than two
automata can be constructed similarly.
For a practical system, the plant can be modeled as an automaton G. The desired behavior
of the controlled system is determined by a control specification, also modeled as an automa-
ton E. Both the plant G and the control specification E may be the synchronous product of
many smaller components.
For supervisory control, the alphabet Σ is partitioned as
Σ = Σc∪˙Σu
where Σc is the subset of controllable events that can be disabled by an external supervisor,
and Σu is the subset of uncontrollable events that cannot directly be prevented from occurring.
Here Σc and Σu are disjoint subsets. A supervisory controller (supervisor) forces the plant
to respect the control specification by disabling certain controllable events that are originally
able to occur in the plant.
To synthesize a satisfactory supervisor, SCT provides a formal method for theoretically
solving the typical supervisory control problem [54]: Given a plant G over alphabet Σ =
Σc∪˙Σu and control specification E, find a maximally permissive supervisor S such that the
controlled system S/G is non-blocking and meets the control specification E. That is S
satisfies
Lm (S) = sup C (E∩Lm (G)) ⊆ Lm (G)
Lm (S) = L (S)
(2)
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7where sup C (L) means the supremal controllable sublanguage of L. Equation (2) means that
the supervisor S never violates the control specification E. Here, S is a monolithic (namely
fully centralized) supervisor [46, Chapter 4.6]. If there exist several control specifications,
the supervisor can be also designed in a decentralized framework. Decentralized supervisory
control assigns a separate specialized supervisor to satisfy each control specification Ej . For
each control specification Ej , a decentralized supervisor Sj is computed in the same way as
for a monolithic supervisor. Then, all the decentralized supervisors work together to meet
the control specification E = E1‖E2‖ · · · . Here, if the synthesized supervisors are blocking,
a coordinator is required to make the supervisors nonblocking. The main advantage of the
decentralized supervisory control framework is that the synthesized supervisors are relatively
small-scale, and are easier to understand, maintain and change.
Related algorithms in DES and SCT can be performed on software platforms such as TCT
software [46], Supremica [57] and Discrete Event Control Kit written in MATLAB [58].
III. SAFETY ISSUES AND USER REQUIREMENTS
This section lists some relevant safety issues of multicopters. Also, user requirements
including functional requirements and safety requirements are textually described.
A. Safety issues
Major types of multicopter failures that may cause accidents will be introduced. Here,
three types of failures are considered, including communication breakdown, sensor failure
and propulsion system anomaly.
• Communication breakdown. Communication breakdown mainly refers to a contact anomaly
between the Remote Controller (RC) transmitter and the multicopter, or between the
Ground Control Station (GCS) and the multicopter. In this paper, for simplicity, only
RC is considered.
• Sensor failure. Sensor failure mainly implies that a sensor on the multicopter cannot
accurately measure related variables, or cannot work properly. This paper considers
the sensor failures including barometer failure, compass failure, GPS failure, Inertial
Navigation System (INS) failure.
• Propulsion system anomaly. Propulsion system anomaly mainly refers to battery fail-
ure and propulsor failure caused by Electronic Speed Controllers (ESCs), motors or
propellers.
More information about safety issues can be found in the book [1].
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8B. User requirements
From the commercial perspective of customers and users, a multicopter product is required
to have general functions as a rotorcraft, and also be capable of coping with the relevant
safety issues. Thus, functional requirements and safety requirements are listed in Tables 1-
4, respectively. They are summarized by referring the material from [45] and the authors’
knowledge and engineering experience.
1) Functional requirements: The following functional requirements describe what behavior
the multicopter is able to perform.
Table 1. Functional requirements
Name Description
FR1 The remote pilot can arm2the multicopter by the RC transmitter and then allow it to take off.
FR2 After taking off, the remote pilot can manually switch the multicopter to fly normally, return to the
base or land automatically by the RC transmitter.
FR3 The remote pilot can manually control the multicopter to land and disarm it by the RC transmitter.
FR4 When the multicopter is flying, the multicopter can realize spot hover, altitude-hold hover and attitude
self-stabilization.
FR5 When the multicopter is flying, the multicopter can automatically switch to returning to the base or land.
2) Safety requirements: The safety requirements restrict what action the user wants the
multicopter to perform under specific situations when it is on the ground, in flight, or in
process of returning and landing.
Table 2. Safety requirements on ground
Name Description
SR1 When the remote pilot tries to arm the multicopter, if the INS and propulsors are both healthy,
the connection to RC transmitter is normal, and the battery’s capacity is adequate, then the
multicopter can be successfully armed and take off. Otherwise, the multicopter cannot be armed.
2Arm is the instruction that the propellers of the multicopter be unlocked; in this case, the multicopter can take off.
Correspondingly, disarm is the instruction that the propellers of the multicopter be locked; in this case, the multicopter
cannot take off.
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9Table 3. Safety requirements in flight
Name Description
SR2 If the multicopter is already on the ground, the multicopter can be manually disarmed by the
RC transmitter, or automatically disarmed if no instruction is sent to the multicopter by
the RC transmitter.
SR3 When the multicopter is flying, if the GPS or compass is unhealthy, the multicopter can only
realize altitude-hold hover rather than spot hover. If the barometer is unhealthy, the multicopter
can only realize attitude self-stabilization. If the corresponding components are recovered, the
multicopter should switch to an advanced hover status.
SR4 When the multicopter is flying and the connection to the RC transmitter becomes abnormal, if the
INS, GPS, barometer, compass and propulsors are all healthy, the multicopter should switch to
returning to the base. Otherwise, the multicopter should switch to landing.
SR5 When the multicopter is flying, if the battery’s capacity becomes inadequate but the multicopter is
able to return to the base, then the multicopter should switch to returning to the base; if the battery’s
capacity becomes inadequate and unable to return, then the multicopter should switch to landing.
SR6 When the multicopter is flying, if the INS or propulsors are unhealthy, the multicopter
should automatically switch to landing.
SR7 When the multicopter is flying, the multicopter can be manually switched to returning to the base by
the RC transmitter. This switch requires that the INS, GPS, barometer, compass, propulsors are
all healthy, and the battery’s capacity is able to support the multicopter to return to the base.
Otherwise, the switch cannot occur.
SR8 When the multicopter is flying, the multicopter can be manually switched to automatically
landing by the RC transmitter.
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Table 4. Safety requirements on returning and landing
Name Description
SR9 When the multicopter is in the process of returning to the base, the multicopter can be
manually switched to normal flight or landing by the RC transmitter.
SR10 When the multicopter is in the process of returning to the base, if the distance to
the base is less than a given threshold, the multicopter should switch to landing; if the
battery’s capacity becomes inadequate and unable to return to the base, the multicopter
should switch to landing; if the INS, GPS, barometer, compass or propulsors are unhealthy,
the multicopter should switch to landing.
SR11 When the multicopter is in the process of landing, the multicopter can be manually switched
to normal flight by the RC transmitter. This switch requires that the INS and propulsors are
both healthy, the connection to the RC transmitter is normal, and the battery’s capacity is
adequate. Otherwise, the switch cannot occur.
SR12 When the multicopter is in the process of landing, the multicopter can be manually switched
to returning to the base by the RC transmitter. This switch requires that the INS, GPS, barometer,
compass, propulsors are all healthy, the battery’s capacity is able to support the multicopter to
return to the base, and the distance to the base is not less than a given threshold.
Otherwise, the switch cannot occur.
SR13 When the multicopter is in the process of landing, if the multicopter’s altitude is lower
than a given threshold, or the multicopter’s throttle is less than a given threshold
over a time horizon, the multicopter can be automatically disarmed.
IV. MULTICOPTER MODE AND EVENT DEFINITION
In order to transform the user requirements to automata, several multicopter modes and
events are defined in this section.
A. Multicopter mode
Referring to [45], the whole process from taking off to landing of multicopters is divided
into eight multicopter modes. They form the basis of the failsafe mechanism.
• POWER OFF MODE. This mode implies that a multicopter is out of power. In this
mode, the remote pilot can (possibly) disassemble, maintain and replace the hardware
of a multicopter.
• STANDBY MODE. When a multicopter is connected to the power module, it enters a
pre-flight status. In this mode, the multicopter is not armed, and the remote pilot can
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arm the multicopter manually. Afterwards, the multicopter will perform a safety check
and then transit to the next mode according to the results of the safety check.
• GROUND-ERROR MODE. This mode indicates that the multicopter has a safety prob-
lem. In this mode, the buzzer will turn on an alarm to alert the remote pilot that there
exist errors in the multicopter.
• LOITER MODE. Under this mode, the remote pilot can use the control sticks of the RC
transmitter to control the multicopter. Horizontal location can be adjusted by the roll and
pitch control sticks. When the remote pilot releases the control sticks, the multicopter
will slow to a stop. Altitude can be controlled by the throttle control stick. The heading
can be set with the yaw control stick. When the remote pilot releases the roll, pitch and
yaw control sticks and pushes the throttle control stick to the mid-throttle deadzone, the
multicopter will automatically maintain the current location, heading and altitude.
• ALTITUDE-HOLD MODE. Under this mode, a multicopter maintains a consistent
altitude while allowing roll, pitch and yaw to be controlled normally. When the throttle
control stick is in the mid-throttle deadzone, the throttle is automatically controlled to
maintain the current altitude and the attitude is also stabilized but the horizontal position
drift will occur. The remote pilot will need to regularly give roll and pitch commands
to keep the multicopter in place. When the throttle control stick goes outside the mid-
throttle deadzone, the multicopter will descend or climb depending upon the deflection
of the control stick.
• STABILIZE MODE. This mode allows a remote pilot to fly the multicopter manually,
but self-levels the roll and pitch axes. When the remote pilot releases the roll and pitch
control sticks, the multicopter automatically stabilizes its attitude but position drift may
occur. During this process, the remote pilot will need to regularly give roll, pitch and
throttle commands to keep the multicopter in place as it might be pushed around by
wind.
• RETURN-TO-LAUNCH (RTL) MODE. Under this mode, the multicopter will return to
the base location from the current position, and hover there.
• AUTOMATIC-LANDING (AL) MODE. In this mode, the multicopter realizes automatic
landing by adjusting the throttle according to the estimated height 3.
3Even if the barometer fails, the height estimation is acceptable within a short time. Similarly, the other estimates generated
by filters could continue to be used for a short time, even if related sensors fail.
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B. Event definition
Three types of events are defined here: Manual Input Events (MIEs), Mode Control Events
(MCEs) and Automatic Trigger Events (ATEs). The failsafe mechanism detects the occurrence
of MIEs and ATEs, and uses MCEs to decide which mode the multicopter should stay in
or switch to. Here, MIEs and MCEs are controllable, while ATEs are uncontrollable in the
sense of SCT.
1) MIEs: MIEs are instructions from the remote pilot sent through the RC transmitter.
This part defines eight MIEs as shown in Table 5.
Table 5. MIE definition
Name Description
MIE1 Turn on the power.
MIE2 Turn off the power
MIE3 Execute arm action. This action is realized by manipulating the sticks of the RC transmitter.
MIE4 Execute disarm action.
MIE5 Other actions manipulated by the sticks of the RC transmitter. These actions correspond to
normal operations by the remote pilot. Here, no manipulation on the sticks is also inclusive.
MIE6 Switch to normal flight. In normal flight, the multicopter can be in either LOITER MODE,
ALTITUDE-HOLD MODE or STABILIZE MODE.
MIE7 Switch to RTL MODE.
MIE8 Switch to AL MODE.
Here, MIE6, MIE7 and MIE8 are realized by a three-position switch (namely the flight
mode switch) on the RC transmitter as shown in Figure 3.
Three-
position
switch
MANUAL
FLIGHT
MODE
RC
Transmitter RTL
MODE
AUTO-
LANDING
MODE
Fig. 3. Flight mode switch
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2) MCEs: MCEs are instructions from multicopter’s autopilot. As shown in Table 6, these
events will control the multicopter to switch to a specified mode.
Table 6. MCE definition
Name Description
MCE1 Multicopter switched to POWER OFF MODE.
MCE2 Multicopter switched to STANDBY MODE.
MCE3 Multicopter switched to GROUND-ERROR MODE.
MCE4 Multicopter switched to LOITER MODE.
MCE5 Multicopter switched to ALTITUDE-HOLD MODE.
MCE6 Multicopter switched to STABILIZE MODE.
MCE7 Multicopter switched to RTL MODE.
MCE8 Multicopter switched to AL MODE.
3) ATEs: ATEs are independent of the remote pilot’s operations. As shown in Table 7,
these events contain the health check results of onboard equipment and sensor measurements
of the multicopter status.
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Table 7. ATE definition
Name Description
ATE1 The check result of INS is healthy.
ATE2 The check result of INS is unhealthy.
ATE3 The check result of GPS is healthy.
ATE4 The check result of GPS is unhealthy.
ATE5 The check result of barometer is healthy.
ATE6 The check result of barometer is unhealthy.
ATE7 The check result of compass is healthy.
ATE8 The check result of compass is unhealthy.
ATE9 The check result of propulsors is healthy.
ATE10 The check result of propulsors is unhealthy.
ATE11 The check result of connection to the RC transmitter is normal.
ATE12 The check result of connection to the RC transmitter is abnormal.
ATE13 The measured battery’s capacity is adequate.
ATE14 The measured battery’s capacity is inadequate, able to RTL.
ATE15 The measured battery’s capacity is inadequate, unable to RTL.
ATE16 The measured multicopter’s altitude is lower than a given threshold.
ATE17 The measured multicopter’s altitude is not lower than a given threshold.
ATE18 The measured multicopter’s distance from the base is less than a given threshold.
ATE19 The measured multicopter’s distance from the base is not less than a given threshold.
ATE20 The measured multicopter’s throttle is less than a given threshold over a time horizon.
ATE21 Other throttle situation.
Here, note that this paper assumes the health check of equipment above can be performed
by effective fault diagnosis and health evaluation methods. For simplified presentation, the
statements of “check result of” and “measured” are omitted in the subsequent sections.
Remark 1. MCEs are defined to guarantee the controllability of the plant, because super-
visory control restricts the behavior of a plant such that the given control specifications are
fulfilled and as much as possible never violated, by enabling or disabling controllable events
in the plant. According to safety requirements, the user declares which mode the multicopter
should enter. This leads to the definition of controllable events related to mode transitions,
namely MCEs.
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V. FAILSAFE MECHANISM DESIGN
The failsafe mechanism uses multicopter modes and switch conditions among them to make
multicopters satisfy the user’s safety requirements. In this section, functional requirements
are used to model a multicopter plant automaton with defined multicopter modes and events.
Then, from the safety requirements, multiple control specifications are represented by au-
tomata. These control specifications should indicate the preferable failsafe measures consistent
with the textually described safety requirements. After the plant and control specifications
have been obtained, the supervisor is synthesized by using monolithic supervisory control.
A. Multicopter plant modeling
1) Modeling principles: Modeling the multicopter plant is to mathematically describe what
behavior the multicopter is able to perform with an automaton transformed from functional
requirements. In this paper, the modeling principles of the multicopter plant include: i)
modeling from a simple schematic diagram to a comprehensive automaton model; 2) modeling
from the ‘on ground’ component to the ‘in air’ component; 3) events of each transition
modeled mutually exclusively. Figure 4 depicts a schematic diagram of the ‘on ground’
component and ‘in air’ component of the multicopter plant, respectively. The schematic
diagram lists all modes which the multicopter possibly enters, after a series of MIEs and
ATEs occur.
ATEs,MIEs
MCE2
MCE3
MCE4
MCE2MIE1
MCE1
M1E2
M1E2
ATEs,MIEs
MCEi, i=4,5,6,7,8
MCEj, j=2,3
MCE4
?in air?component ?on ground?component
(a)?on ground?component (b)?in air?component
Fig. 4. Schematic diagram of the multicopter plant
2) Model details: By extending the above schematic diagrams with detailed events and
transitions, the plant is described by an automaton as shown in Figure 5. It describes the
basic function of a multicopter. Specifically, Plant contains 27 states (S0-S26), 37 events and
63 transitions. Here, the states S0,S3,S13,S14 are marked as accepting states. The state S0
represents POWER OFF MODE; the state S3 represents STANDBY MODE; the state S13
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?on ground? component
?in air? component
S0 S3 S13
S14
S26
Fig. 5. Automaton model of Plant. In this plant, the following functions are described in the automaton model: i) if the
power is turned on (MIE1 occurs), the multicopter enters STANDBY MODE (MCE2 occurs); ii) in STANDBY MODE,
if the power is turned off (MIE2 occurs), the multicopter enters POWER OFF MODE (MCE1 occurs); iii) in STANDBY
MODE, according to remote pilot’s operation (MIE3-MIE8) and the health status of onboard equipment (ATE1-ATE15),
the multicopter may either enter LOITER MODE (MCE4 occurs), GROUND-ERROR MODE (MCE3 occurs), or stay in
STANDBY MODE (MCE2 occurs); iv) in LOITER MODE, according to remote pilot’s operation (MIE3-MIE8) the health
status of onboard equipment (ATE1-ATE15), and the multicopter status (ATE16-ATE21), the multicopter can switch among
LOITER MODE (MCE4 occurs), ALTITUDE-HOLD MODE (MCE5 occurs), STABILIZE MODE (MCE6 occurs), RTL
MODE (MCE7 occurs) and AL MODE (MCE8 occurs); v) the multicopter can also be manually or automatically disarmed,
and enter STANDBY MODE (MCE2 occurs) or GROUND-ERROR MODE (MCE3 occurs).
represents GROUND-ERROR MODE; the state S14 integrates other multicopter modes. Plant
can be divided into two parts: one (consists of states S0-S14 and transitions among them)
describes the multicopter behavior on the ground (‘on ground’ component), and the other
one (consists of states S3,S12-S26 and transitions among them) describes the behavior during
flight (‘in air’ component). These correspond to the schematic diagram shown in Figure 4.
B. Control specification design
1) Modeling principle: In this part, control specifications are designed to restrict the
behavior of Plant according to the description of the safety requirements. In order to obtain a
correct and non-blocking supervisor, the control specifications must cover all possible strings
(enable desirable strings and disable the others) in the plant, and the control specifications
must have no conflict among themselves.
2) Control specification design ‘on ground’: Through a study of safety requirements, it
can be seen that SR1 describes the intended failsafe measure when the multicopter is on the
April 28, 2017 DRAFT
17
ground. In other words, SR1 restricts what action the user wants the multicopter to perform
under specific situations when it is on the ground. Thus, we design a control specification
to cover all possible strings in the ‘on ground’ component of Plant. The requirements given
in Tables 1-3 are different from the designed specifications. The former is textually and
informally described, whereas, based on which, the latter is designed formally described
in form of automaton. Several requirements may be described by one specification, or one
requirement may be described by several specifications.
In safety requirement SR1, the user lists the required conditions for a successful arm. In
order to model it with an automaton, the key is to split the branches in the ‘on ground’
component of Plant, and enable only one mode which the user expects the multicopter to
switch to. Following this principle, a control specification named Specification 1 is designed
as shown in Figure 6. It contains 8 states (S0-S7), 24 events and 68 transitions. Here, the
states S0,S1 are marked as accepting states. The state S1 represents STANDBY MODE, and
the state S0 integrates other multicopter modes. Here, two points need to be noted:
i) The selfloops on the state S0,S4,S6 are used to guarantee that the irrelevant events will
not interrupt the event sequence presented in Plant, and not influence the occurrence of other
control specifications.
ii) SR1 itself is textually and informally described. It does not mention which mode the
multicopter should enter, if it cannot be successfully armed. Furthermore, it does not take all
possible strings into consideration. In this case, during the design of control specifications,
it is required to appropriately infer the user’s potential intention, and add the omitted part
to guarantee that the control specification covers all possible strings in the ‘on ground’
component of Plant.
3) Control specification design ‘in ground’ (Specification 7): For the ‘in air’ component
of Plant, safety requirements SR2-SR13 restrict what action the user wants the multicopter to
perform under specific situations when it is in air. Thus, we design 24 control specifications
to cover all possible strings in the ‘in air’ component of Plant. The traversal relation between
the designed control specifications and the structure of the ‘in air’ component of Plant is
shown in Figure 7.
Here, because of limitation of space, we take Specification 7 as an example to demonstrate
the design of control specifications for the ‘in air’ component of Plant. This control specifica-
tion is obtained by transforming “safety requirements SR7 and SR8” to an automaton model.
As shown in Figure 8, Specification 7 contains 6 states (S0-S5), 31 events and 91 transitions.
Here, the states S0,S1 are marked as accepting states. The state S1 represents LOITER MODE,
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Fig. 6. Automaton model of Specification 1. In Specification 1, the multicopter is first in STANDBY MODE (MCE2 occurs).
In this case, when the remote pilot executes an arm action (MIE3 occurs), if the INS and propulsors are both healthy (ATE1
and ATE9 occur), the connection to RC transmitter is normal (ATE11 occurs), the battery’s capacity is adequate (ATE13
occurs), and the flight mode switch is on the position of “normal flight” (MIE6 occurs), then the multicopter can be
successfully armed, and enter LOITER MODE (MCE4 occurs). Otherwise, if the remote pilot does not execute an arm
action (MIE4 or MIE5 occurs), or the flight mode switch is not on the position of “normal flight” (MIE7 or MIE8 occurs),
the multicopter stays in STANDBY MODE (MCE2 occurs); if one of the related component is unhealthy (ATE2, ATE10,
ATE12, ATE14 or ATE15 occurs), the multicopter enters GROUND-ERROR MODE (MCE3 occurs). Also, the remote pilot
can directly turn off the power (MIE2 occurs), and the multicopter enters POWER OFF mode (MCE1 occurs).
and the state S0 integrates other multicopter modes. The details of other control specifications
are presented in the support material available in http://rfly.buaa.edu.cn/resources.
C. Supervisor synthesis on TCT software
The algorithms and operations in this part are performed on TCT software. In order
to synthesize a supervisor by TCT software, the modeled multicopter plant and designed
control specifications are first input. The multicopter plant is named as “PLANT”, and the
25 control specifications are named as “Ej”, j = 1, 2, · · · , 25. The input process is shown
in http://rfly.buaa.edu.cn/resources.
1) Control specification completion: Here, note that PLANT contains 37 events, while the
number of events in each Ej is less than 37 (i.e. the alphabet of each Ej is different from that
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Fig. 7. Traversal relation between 24 control specifications and the structure of the ‘in air’ component of Plant
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Fig. 8. Automaton model of Specification 7. Specification 7 is triggered under the two successive conditions: i) the
multicopter is in LOITER MODE (MCE4 occurs), ii) and then the remote pilot normally manipulates the sticks of the
RC transmitter (MIE5 occurs). In this case, when the remote pilot uses the flight mode switch to manually switch the
multicopter to RTL MODE (MIE7 occurs), if the INS, GPS, barometer, compass, propulsors are all healthy (ATE1, ATE3,
ATE5, ATE7 and ATE9 occur ), the connection to the RC transmitter is normal (ATE11 occurs), the battery’s capacity is
able to support the multicopter to return to the base (ATE13 or ATE14 occurs), and the multicopter’s distance from the base
is not less than a given threshold (ATE19 occurs), then the multicopter enters RTL MODE (MCE7 occurs); otherwise, the
multicopter stays in LOITER MODE (MCE4 occurs). Furthermore, when the remote pilot uses the flight mode switch to
manually switch the multicopter to AL MODE (MIE8 occurs), the multicopter enters AL MODE (MCE8 occurs).
of PLANT). This is because the given textual safety requirements only emphasize the events
we are concerned with and ignore the remaining events. For supervisory control, the alphabet
of each Ej should be equal to the alphabet of PLANT. Thus, the control specification should
be completed by the following TCT instructions:
EVENTS = allevents (PLANT)
where EVENTS is a selfloop automaton containing all events in the alphabet of PLANT.
Then, for each Ej , we have
Ej = sync (Ej ,EVENTS) .
Here, the events present in PLANT but not in Ej are added into Ej in form of selfloops.
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2) Supervisor synthesis: In the monolithic supervisory control framework, all the control
specifications should be synchronized into a monolithic one. That is
E = sync (E1,E2, · · ·E25) .
It turns out that E is nonblocking, and contains 133 states and 2219 transitions. Then, a
monolithic supervisor is synthesized by
S = supcon (PLANT,E) .
The obtained supervisor is the expected failsafe mechanism. It contains 784 states, 37 events
and 1554 transitions. There are 8 accepting states to be marked, which correspond respectively
to 8 multicopter modes. Besides the monolithic supervisory control, the supervisor can also
be synthesized by decentralized supervisory control, and a supervisor reduction process can
also be carried out for an easier realization in practice. The synthesis is also carried out
in the software Supremica with the result same to TCT. These source files are presented in
http://rfly.buaa.edu.cn/resources.
VI. EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION
This section illustrates three examples to demonstrate some possible reasons leading to
a problematic supervisor, and gives a brief discussion about the scope of applications and
properties of the method.
A. Examples
The design of control specifications is a process to understand and re-organize the safety
requirements. If the designer synthesizes a blocking supervisor, he must recheck the cor-
rectness of control specifications and make modifications. Here, we illustrate three examples
demonstrating the blocking phenomenon due to inappropriate design of control specifications
and conflicting safety requirements.
Example 1. The aim of this example is to show that missing information in control specifi-
cation may lead to a blocking supervisor. In this example, we delete transitions “S6 →ATE13→S6”,
“S6 →ATE14→S6” and “S6 →ATE15→S6” in Specification 1. In this case, Specification 1 is
changed to an automaton named Example 1 as shown in Figure 9. By replacing Specification
1 with Example 1, the supervisor is synthesized and turns out to be blocking. The blocking
branch is depicted in Figure 10. The reason is that blocking occurs owing to the missing
selfloops at state S6 in Example 1. The missing selfloops make the automaton “think” that
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events ATE13, ATE14 and ATE15 will not occur at state S6, while these events should occur
in Plant. Thus, a blocking supervisor is synthesized. This means an uncertainty as to what
should occur in the blocking point.
Compared to Specification 1,
ATE13,ATE14, ATE15 are deleted here.
Fig. 9. Automaton model of Example 1
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Fig. 10. Diagram of a blocking supervisor in Example 1
Example 2. The aim of this example is to show that conflict in control specifications will
lead to a blocking supervisor. In this example, we replace the transition “S6 →MCE2→S1”
with a transition “S6 →MCE3→S1” in Specification 1. In this case, Specification 1 is changed
to an automaton named Example 2 as shown in Figure 11. By adding Example 2 to the whole
control specification, the supervisor is synthesized and turns out to be blocking. The blocking
branch is depicted in Figure 12. The reason that blocking occurs is the conflict between
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Specification 1 and Example 2. Specification 1 indicates a transition “S6 →MCE2→S1”, while
Example 2 has a transition “S6 →MCE3→S1”. This conflict will “confuse” the supervisor,
and make it impossible to decide which transition should occur. Thus, a blocking supervisor
is synthesized.
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Fig. 11. Automaton model of Example 2
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Fig. 12. Diagram of a blocking supervisor in Example 2
Example 3. The aim of this example is to show that conflict in user requirements will lead
to a blocking supervisor. Assume we have a new safety requirement described as follows:
“when the multicopter is flying, the multicopter can be manually switched to return to the
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base by the RC transmitter. This switch requires that the INS, GPS, barometer, compass and
propulsors are all healthy. Otherwise, the switch cannot occur.” Then, this safety requirement
is transformed to an automaton as shown in Figure 13. By adding Example 3 to the whole
control specification, the supervisor is synthesized and turns out to be blocking. The blocking
branch is depicted in Figure 14. The reason that blocking appeared is the conflict between
the original SR7 and the newly presented safety requirement. In SR7, it indicates that “this
switch requires that the INS, GPS, barometer, compass, propulsors are all healthy, and the
battery’s capacity is able to support the multicopter to return to the base”. However, the new
safety requirement does not restrict the condition of battery’s capacity. As in Example 2,
this conflict leads to a blocking supervisor.
Compared to Specification 7,
ATE13,ATE14 are deleted here.
Fig. 13. Automaton model of Example 3
Remark 2. From the above examples, it can be seen that an incorrect failsafe mechanism
might be obtained during the design process due to conflicting safety requirements or incorrect
and inappropriate design of control specifications. The mistake might be introduced inadver-
tently, and the designer cannot easily detect the problem by using empirical design methods.
However, by relying on the SCT-based method, we can check the correctness of the obtained
failsafe mechanism, and make modifications if a problematic supervisor is generated. This is
a big advantage of the proposed method over empirical design methods. Once a nonblocking
supervisor is obtained, the resulting failsafe mechanism is logically correct, and able to deal
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Fig. 14. Diagram of blocked supervisor in Example 3
with all relevant safety issues appearing during flight.
B. Discussion
This paper aims to study a method to guarantee the correctness in the design of the failsafe
mechanism. Actually, correctness can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand,
correctness can be explained as absolute safety, meaning that the multicopter can cope with
all possible safety problems. On the other hand, correctness is defined as consistency between
the obtained failsafe mechanism and safety requirements. Given a model and a control
specification for an autonomous system, synthesis approaches can automatically generate
a protocol (or strategy) for controlling the system that satisfies or optimizes the property.
This process is named as “correct-by-design” [59]. In this domain, various formal methods
and techniques, such as SCT and linear temporal logic, are used to design control protocol
of autonomous systems, including autonomous cars [60], aircraft [61]-[63] and swarm robots
[64]. Similar to the above literature, in this paper, we focus on the meaning of correctness that
all requirements can be correctly satisfied. With a precise description of both the multicopter
and its correct behavior, the proposed method allows a failsafe mechanism that guarantees
the correct behavior of the system to be automatically designed.
Here, the generated supervisor by SCT satisfies the following properties:
i) Deterministic. This property has two aspects. First, there exists no situation that one
event triggers a transition from a single source state to different target states in the obtained
supervisor. This is a necessary condition for a deterministic automaton. However, this situation
might occur due to man-made mistakes in an empirical failsafe mechanism design. Second,
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after occurrence of MIEs and ATEs, SCT can guarantee that only one MCE is enabled
by disabling other MCEs due to deliberate design of control specifications. In this case,
after occurrence of certain MIEs and ATEs, the mode which the multicopter should enter is
deterministic.
ii) Nonconflicting [46, Chapter 3.6]. None of the control specifications conflict with any
others. If there exist conflicts, the supervisor will not be successfully synthesized, because
SCT cannot decide which control specification is the user’s true intention. If so, the designer
should check 1) the correctness of control specifications transforming from user requirements;
or 2) the reasonableness of the user requirements.
iii) Nonblocking. The generated supervisor is nonblocking, which can be interpreted that all
possible strings in Plant are considered (either enabled or disabled) in the supervisor. If there
are some strings which are not considered in the control specifications, the marker states may
not be reached in some branches from the initial state. Then, the obtained supervisor might
be incomplete (even empty). This is because SCT cannot compute control due to incorrect
user’s specifications. If so, the designer should modify the control specifications to make
them consistent.
iv) Logical correctness. SCT is a mature and effective tool to be used in the area of
decision-making. If the plant and control specifications are correctly modeled, the logic of
the generated supervisor will correctly satisfy user requirements without introducing man-
made mistakes and bugs.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION
Based on the obtained supervisory controller generated by TCT software or Supremica,
an implementation method suitable for multicopter is presented, in which the supervisory
controller is transformed into decision-making codes.
A. Failsafe mechanism implementation
On the one hand, we would want to avoid manual implementation of the calculated
supervisors, since this may introduce errors and is also difficult for a complex case. On the
other hand, we expect an easy way to generate an Application Programming Interface (API)
function with events as the input and marked states as output so that it can be easily integrated
into the existing program in flight boards. The information required from a synthesized
supervisor is a transition matrix, which is an m × 3 matrix where m is the number of
transitions in the synthesized supervisor (We have developed a function to export the transition
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matrix based on the output file of Supremica, available in http://rfly.buaa.edu.cn/resources).
As shown in Table 8, in each row, it consists of a source state, a destination state and
a triggered event. For example, if the multicopter is in source state 1 and the triggered
event is 1, then the destination state will be 2. By taking the synthesized supervisor of
multicopters as an example, it contains 784 states, 37 events and 1554 transitions. So, the
transition matrix is an 1554× 3 matrix. In fact, we only need to consider 8 accepting states,
namely POWER OFF MODE, STANDBY MODE, GROUND-ERROR MODE, LOITER
MODE, ALTITUDE-HOLD MODE, STABILIZE MODE, RTL MODE and AL MODE.
Based on them, corresponding low-level control actions exist. However, there exist many
intermediate states in the transition matrix (784 − 8 = 776 intermediate states for the
considered multicopter), to which no control actions correspond. Therefore, after one decision
period, the system must be in an accepting state. This is a major problem we need to solve.
Fortunately, this is always true.
Table 8. Transition matrix
Source state Destination state Triggered Event
1 2 1
...
...
...
2 3 3
In practice, the events will be detected every 0.01s for example, while the decision period
may be 1s. All triggered events are collected in every decision period. By recalling Figure
5, since the events in every transition are mutually exclusive, one and only one event must
be triggered for any transition. As a result, the system does not stop at intermediate states
after feeding in all detected events. For example, by recalling the ‘in air’ component in
Figure 5, if the initial state is S14 and we collect the events MIE5, MIE6, ATE1, ATE3,
ATE5, ATE7, ATE9, ATE11, ATE13, ATE16, ATE18, ATE20, then the system will go to
S26 in Plant. Consequently, only one MCEi will be enabled by the autopilot according to the
specifications. Therefore, the system will stop at an accepting state finally. For our case, the
failsafe mechanism is implemented as shown in Table 9, where ∆ > 0 represents a decision-
making time interval. Actually, the high-level decision-making should be a relatively slow
process in practice. Thus, the failsafe mechanism implementation is not synchronized with
the low-level flight control system.
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Table 9. Decision-making logic implementation
Step Description
1. Export a transition matrix from the supervisor synthesized by TCT software or Supremica; k = 0;
∆ > 0 is a positive integer representing a decision-making time interval; the initial state s = s0.
2. k = k + 1
3. Detect the instruction from the RC transmitter, health status of all considered equipments and
flight status of the multicopter. If mod(k,∆) = 0, go to Step 4; Otherwise, go to Step 2.
4. Generate an event set occurred in the decision-making time interval ∆.
5. By starting at state s with the events inputed according to the occurrence order in Plant one by one,
search the transition matrix when an event is inputed. After all the MIEs and ATEs are inputed
completely, search the transition matrix again, and only one match will be found, where the
triggered event is an MCE and the destination state is s1.
6. s = s1, go to Step 2.
B. Simulation
In this part, we put the failsafe mechanism into a real-time flight simulation platform of
quadcopters developed by MATLAB. Although it is realized by MATLAB, this method is
applicable to any programming language. The simulation diagram is shown in Figure 15. This
simulation contains three main functions: i) the failsafe mechanism can determine the flight
mode according to the health check result, instruction of RC transmitter and quadcopter
status; ii) the remote pilot can fly the quadcopter through RC transmitter; iii) the flight
status of quadcopter can be visually displayed by FlightGear. Thus, this simulation can be
viewed as a semi-autonomous autopilot simulation of quadcopters. A video of this simula-
tion is presented in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1-K2xWbwF8&feature=youtu.be or
http://t.cn/RXmhnu6. It contains three scenarios: i) the remote pilot manually controls the
quadcopter to arm, fly, return to launch, and land; ii) anomalies of GPS, barometer, and INS
are occurred during flight; iii) the connection of RC transmitter is abnormal during flight.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes an SCT based method to design a failsafe mechanism of multicopters.
The modeling process of system plant and control specifications is presented in detail. The
failsafe mechanism is obtained by synthesizing a supervisor in a monolithic framework. It
ignores the detailed dynamic behavior underlying each multicopter mode. This is reasonable
because the failsafe mechanism belongs to the high-level decision-making module of a
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Fig. 15. Simulation diagram
multicopter, while the dynamic behavior can be characterized and controlled in the low-level
flight control system. Also, we discuss the meaning of correctness and the properties of the
obtained supervisor. This makes the failsafe mechanism convincingly correct and effective,
demonstrating that the proposed method improves on purely empirical design methods. This
paper deals with the health status of multicopter components in a qualitative manner. In future
research, a quantitative health index will be added to extend the failsafe mechanism.
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